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1Introduction and Outline
In the early 1960s famine caused 30 million excess deaths in China.
India, rurally stagnant and having almost run out of spare cropland,
barely escaped famine in 1965-66. New censuses, throughout the
developing world, revealed a future of accelerating population growth.
But crop research, its institutions, and its results responded. Despite
some setbacks and huge regional gaps, global poverty reduction—and
tropical food staples yields—advanced more in the twenty years from
the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s than in the previous century.
The reduction of poverty was partly caused by the expansion of food
staples production through poverty-orientated agricultural research.
That was in substantial part made possible by Sir John Crawford’s
recognition of the need for institutional innovations, and his patience
and energy in implementing and guiding them. That is why we honor
him now.
But he would wish us to honor him, too, by realizing that, 28 years
after the CGIAR began, a new thrust is needed. Over 800 million
people still have too little to eat; many live from agricultures almost
untouched by the Green Revolution. Food farming is increasingly
dogged by water shortage and diversion. Most worryingly, since the
mid-1980s progress against poverty has slowed down sharply, and so
has progress in yields of main food staples in developing countries.
This now crawls along at barely half the rate of growth, 1995-2020, of
people needing work to afford food. Meanwhile, there has been slow,
if any, increase in basic yield-enhancing crop research from public
funds—while private research has exploded. This has meant that crop
research is much less directed towards the food staples of poor people.
The most promising potential remedy, based on new science—genetic
modification of plants—is accordingly being directed more to the
demands of rich farmers and their corporate suppliers than to the
needs of poor people: chicken-feed before human food; tobacco
before wheat; crops that resist not moisture stress but herbicides.
2This lecture presents seven inter-related points.
1. The world’s poor depend mainly on farm work for access to staple
foods—and on higher yields of main food staples for prospects of
escaping poverty. This was true when Sir John Crawford tackled
the problem as a founding father of the CGIAR. It is true today.
Despite urbanization, it will still be true in 2020.
2. World poverty fell fast in 1965-85—and fell most where, when
and because foodstaples yields grew rapidly due partly to
burgeoning pro bono agricultural research and in ways that created
more workplaces. The trends have slowed to trickles since 1987,
and the four slowdowns are causally linked.
3. There are new grounds for hope, because the fertility transition in
South Asia—and recently Africa—means not only slower
population growth, but also a rising ratio of adults to children. In
East and Southeast Asia since 1965 these extra adults were
productively employed, initially in the Green Revolution.
Therefore the demographic ‘window of opportunity’ opened—
and, indeed, explained one-third of the region’s dramatic rise in
income per person, and probably even more of its fall in poverty.
The fertility transition has now spread to the heartlands of world
poverty, South Asia and Africa, where the coming decades will see
a sharp rise in the proportion of persons of working age. But this
‘window of opportunity’, for these areas to cut poverty, will open
only if—as happened in East and Southeast Asia—the burgeoning
adults find productive work and access to nearby, reliable food.
Adequate, affordable and attractive workplaces initially require
growth in agriculture (and in rural trade and construction, which
rely on rising farm income and expenditure).
4. After 2000 as after 1960, such gains can be realized—and the
flagging pace of poverty reduction revived—only if new science
boosts yield potentials in tropical food staples, and thus output and
employment, where the poor live. On their own the alternatives
will not nearly suffice. It is cold comfort, for example, if ‘there is
enough food already to feed the world’. The hungry cannot get at
it, except with extra labor income. That is created initially by
agricultural growth.
35. Genetically modified (GM) plants can revive yield potentials in
major food staples, and thus and otherwise address many
problems of poverty and malnutrition. But that will not happen
until GM research focus shifts: from traits such as herbicide
resistance to higher yields and drought tolerance; from crops that
feed chickens, to crops that feed people; and from huge, low-
employment farms, to smallholders and farm laborers.
6. GM crops’ potential to revive the stalled engine of world poverty
reduction will not be fulfilled, unless the next few years see
institutional innovation as radical as the development of the
CGIAR system, to which Sir John contributed so much. The huge
shift of crop science to the private profit sector—alongside the
growth of laws and techniques to protect private intellectual
property rights—has created a situation very different from that of
the 1970s for which the CGIAR was designed. Then, national and
international public researchers had access to most agricultural
knowledge of potential relevance to the poor’s needs. Today, a
growing proportion of knowledge is locked into a few giant GM
firms. They do not yet face incentives to direct their huge
resources against world poverty. Yet public research will wither if
it demonizes or ignores these firms, and hence the vast bulk of
GM science locked into them. There are two strategic options; the
CGIAR requires to choose between them.
7. Much as we may dislike the arena of popular politics, scientists
and economists need to shift the debate about GM foods, from
today’s sterile confrontation between commercialisers and critics,
to serious review of the new institutions needed to achieve the
antipoverty potential of GM crops safely and swiftly. Today, the
commercial lobby overstates near-term gains to the poor from
GM science in its current, largely profit-orientated organizational
structures. Meanwhile the anti-GM lobby overstates the risk from
GM crops, and belittles the far greater risk of worsening nutrition
in their absence. The critics dominate the media (almost as a
notorious patent monopolizes transgenic cotton). They create
dangers that GM crop science will be demonized, discouraged or
disallowed—whether it inserts a gene for herbicide resistance that
adds millions of dollars to glyphosate profits each year, or for
beta-carotene that saves millions of children from blindness each
4year. The commercialisers meanwhile create dangers that the
public sector loses access to leading scientists, and to the elite lines
that its own research has made possible. Public agricultural
research could wither away as it becomes unable to provide
competitive varieties that raise and stabilize yields. If that happens,
the engine of poverty reduction will probably stay stalled.
Point 1:  The poor continue to depend on staples for
income and progress, via consumption, prices,
nutrition, employment, farm income, and overall
rural income
(a) Food staples typically absorb half the consumption of people below
the dollar-a-day poverty line. That will stay true in 2020. Local
production affects staples price levels (though this will get less
important if agricultural liberalization proceeds)—but, even more,
price stability (which may well become more important).  It is
sometimes argued that higher crop yields, by cheapening food, will
raise income mainly for urban net food buyers (Abler et al. 1995);
but most of the rural poor in Asia, and in much of Africa and
Latin America, are also deficit farmers or net food buyers.
(b) Food staples are the main source of nutrients, especially for the
poor. This argues for GM staples with more vitamin A, iron, and
(in goitre-prone areas, and if technically feasible) iodine. It seldom
makes any case for GM crops enriched with proteins, or with, say,
lysine; only in rare cases—in the absence of dietary energy
shortfall—is nutritional adequacy, even among the poor,
constrained by inadequacy of protein, let alone of a particular
amino acid.
(c) More staples production is the most affordable source of
workplaces. Employment and self-employment income provides
poor people’s main claim on food entitlements. Agriculture,
mainly staples, remains the main source of employment for over
75% of developing world’s rural people and over 8% of their
5urban people (and higher proportions of poor). Extra non-farm
workplaces, even rurally, have higher capital and infrastructure
costs than extra farm workplaces. Table 1 confirms that, even in
South and Southeast (S/SE) Asia, most people in 1990 depended
mainly on farming for a livelihood; the proportion of low-income
people that depended on farming was much higher. Yet poverty in
S/SE Asia had fallen sharply in 1960-90 (Table 2). So it is not
surprising that, on reasonable expectations about growth and
poverty, even in 2010 half the developing world’s people are
projected to look mainly to farming for livelihoods. For low-
income groups, again, the proportion will be much higher, partly
because the investment and infrastructural costs per extra
workplace are less, and partly because of the shift from own-
account farming to hired farm employment. Extra cash crops will
provide some of these extra workplaces, but most will come from
food staples production—to meet demands out of higher
incomes, many with still underfed people, as well as from
population growth.
However, more work in food staples production is attractive only
if labor productivity grows. So, to advance self- and hired-
employment in the large and growing majority of rural areas in
which arable land is scarce, agricultural research must raise output
per worker, but output per hectare—i.e. yield—more, so work per
hectare goes on rising. (We need not be concerned that this will
bring ‘labor shortage’. Workforces are still rising by some 2%
yearly in the developing world to 2020; and ‘labor shortage’ just
means that poor workers get more work each, and/or that their
wage rises. There are, of course, problems about smoothing peaks
and troughs of labor demand—problems that short-duration
varieties, perhaps further assisted by gene transfer methods, can
address.)
(d) More food staples output is a potential source of farm income
growth in Africa. Despite the growing salience of hired work
relative to own-account farming, the latter remains, in much of
Africa and parts of Asia, a main source of income of the rural
poor. Lipton and Longhurst (1989) and Kerr and Kolavalli (1999)
showed that the green revolution did as much for deficit, poorer
6farmers as for others, and spread far into rain-fed areas—
especially after the research emphasis shifted in the early 1970s
from management-intensive, risky varieties suitable mainly for
bigger farms, towards tougher varieties like IR-20. Analogous
shifts in research priorities will be needed, if GM plant research is
to yield similar gains for the poor.
(e) More food staples thus help the poor by raising rural income.
Higher agricultural incomes also help the rural poor by stimulating
non-farm growth (Adams 1999; FAO 1998). This is a big and
growing part of poor rural people’s income and employment—
and is best stimulated by higher agricultural incomes and demand,
especially if they come from higher incomes among smaller
farmers and laborers (Hazell and Ramasamy 1991).
Poverty incidence remains much higher in rural than in urban
areas (Table 2: Lipton and Ravallion). So do numbers of poor in
Asia and Africa. The rural-urban distance, in both intensity and
incidence of poverty, has in general not shrunk in the 1980s and
1990s [Eastwood and Lipton 1999a]. Rural poverty will continue
to show higher incidence, and almost certainly to affect many
more people globally, than urban, in 2010 and probably in 2020.
On normal assumptions this means that higher rural incomes are
better designed to help the poor than higher urban incomes,
especially since intra-urban distribution is usually more unequal
than intra-rural.
Better rural incomes may even be best designed to help the urban
poor (by reducing rural-urban migration—and thus competition
for urban workplaces and homes—and the need for urban-rural
remittances). Moreover, even in urban areas (both small rural
towns and megacities), some 8-12% of people mainly depend on
agriculture for work and income; the proportion of the urban poor
so dependent, and hence unambiguously gaining from higher food
yields as their food deficit declines, is probably much higher.
Hence agricultural employment increases may directly help the
urban poor. In India in 1957-92, growth in rural consumption or
in agricultural production substantially reduced rural and urban
poverty. Urban consumption growth brought some benefits to the
7urban, but none to the rural, poor. Industrial growth did little to
reduce urban or rural poverty [Datt and Ravallion 1996].
Point 2:  1965-85 saw huge falls in poverty based on
rising food yields, employment, and public
agricultural research effort; all four have stalled
since 1985-90
(a) Poverty declines. The sharp retreat of absolute income poverty in
China, (especially in 1977-85), in Indonesia (where it halved in two
successive decades), and elsewhere in East and Southeast (E/SE) Asia
is shown in Table 2. Perhaps less widely known is the progress in
South Asia. In what Inderjit Singh has called the ‘great ascent’, the
proportion below the national poverty line in India—after fluctuating
around 55 per cent from 1951 to 1975—then fell to around 35 per
cent in the late 1980s. Progress in Latin America was concentrated in
1966-80, with slight retreat thereafter. No progress, indeed some
worsening, in income poverty characterized most of Africa until
recently, but even there health and education indicators improved
sharply [Lipton and Ravallion 1995].
There were thus huge, historically unprecedented downtrends in
poverty in many developing countries, though with somewhat
different timings, within 1960-85. The subsequent slowdown also
showed different timings—the late 1970s in Latin America, around
1985 in China, around 1990 in India—but clearly the proportion of
people below the dollar-a-day poverty line in developing countries fell
very slowly between 1987 and 1998—from about 28.7 per cent  to
about 24.3 per cent. (Recent analysis by Dr. Raghendra Jha shows that
India's rapid economic growth in 1992-97 did little to reduce
poverty—far less than the slower, but still significant, growth of 1975-
89.) The proportion remained almost unchanged in sub-Saharan Africa
(46 per cent) and Latin America (15 per cent), and continued to
decline sharply only in East Asia (27 per cent to 15 per cent) (Table
3).
8(b) Causes of poverty decline and its slowdown. Most evidence
suggests that about half of the international variance in poverty (or its
decline) is associated with variance in average real income (or its
growth) [Lipton 1998]. However, as we have seen, not all growth is
equal; for reasons of employment generation, food price moderation,
and poverty location, rural and agricultural growth is better at reducing
overall, and probably even urban, poverty in mainly rural countries with
many poor. There times, and areas, of more staples yield growth are
likely to feature faster poverty reduction.
Why did poverty declines slow down after the mid-1980s? In 1965-85,
poverty reduction was based largely on agricultural progress. Only a
few countries, mostly in E/SE Asia, managed to segue smoothly from
basing poverty reduction on labor-using technical progress in
agriculture, to basing it on fairly rapid and often export-orientated
non-farm growth with a sharply increasing and widely-spread base of
skills; such sequencing required not only carefully phased trade
liberalization and cautious macro-economic management, but also an
earlier base in mass, effective education and literacy. Not only the less
difficult sector for reducing poverty (agriculture), but also the less
difficult regions (Punjab, Aceh, SE China), ecologies (water-controlled
lowlands) and ethno-linguistic groups (mobile majorities) got out of
poverty first—leaving the harder tasks for later. However, falls in
growth of food staples yields, in extra employment per unit of extra
output, and hence in employment-based access to local food staples,
played a major part in the slowdown in poverty reduction.
(c) Staples yield upsurge and slowdown. The trends are shown in
numbers in Table 4, and in charts for cereals in Chart 1 and for roots
and tubers in Chart 2. The turning points vary among regions and
crops, but the ‘total cereals’ and ‘roots and tubers’ yield trends for
developing countries shows clear flattening from the mid-1980s (as do
main staples crops individually).1
                                       
1 Data are best fits (in logs) to a time-trend for exponential growth between
the dates at the start and end of the period. Several dates were tried, and
two sets are shown that avoid start and end years with sharp ‘blips’ due to
isolated variations in climate or relative prices (even with a least-squares
fit, such years ‘draw’ the regression towards extreme start or end values,
9(d) Causes of rising and flattening yield trends. The substantial
improvement in yield trends of food staples yields in much of the
developing world around 1961-85 took place in face of downtrends in
world prices of staples, relative to manufactured goods and farm
inputs. The main reason for the rise was the availability of land-saving,
cost-cutting technical progress in the form of dramatically improved
varieties of wheat and rice, and to a lesser extent other staples.
Why the deterioration in staples yield growth from the 1980s? There
are many causes. Price trends continued unfavorable. Second, staples
production was extended into more marginal areas, reducing average
yields (and their sustainability). Above all (and crucially for the need to
develop a new source of yield growth such as GM plants might offer),
while the more readily available yield gains from dwarfing were
achieved first (leaving new gains progressively harder to find), there
was a necessary shift from yield-enhancing to yield-protecting research,
because:
· Pests responded, to varieties with high but single-gene resistance,
not only by developing new virulent biotypes (which in turn
provoked breeders to counter-attack with newer high-yielding
varieties) but tolerant biotypes of each of many pests, each type
taking too little of the crop to justify searching for new sources of
crop resistance, but together depressing yields.
· High levels of macronutrient fertilization and yields caused and
exposed micronutrient depletion; and when one micronutrient
constraint (say zinc) was removed by further fertilization, another
(perhaps manganese) began to bind.
· The prospect of high yields, and short-duration varieties
permitting double- or triple-cropping, provoked further
                                                                           
leading to perhaps unduly high or low beta estimates). Data for specific
crops are available on request; note that, contrary to what is often said,
maize is not an exception to the rule that developing countries as a whole
showed a flattening of yield growth from the 1980s.
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competitive private water extraction, especially of groundwater,
lowering the water table.
Not only was varietal research necessarily switched from enhancing to
defending yields; there was a slowdown in public sector research
expenditure for developing countries, on which staples yield growth
there—especially but not only for self-pollinated crops—critically
depends. Such expenditure fell absolutely and sharply from the early
1980s in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, and there was
stagnation after 1986 in CGIAR funding—which was also heavily
redirected from plant breeding towards other priorities.2
(f) Employment and yields. for wheat and rice, an extra 10 per cent
of yields in the mid-1970s in the developing world typically meant an
extra 4% of workplaces. By the late 1980s it meant typically only 1-1.5
per cent [Lipton with Longhurst 1989: 111-4]. So not only is faltering
yield growth reducing cheap, accessible local food staples growth. For
each unit of extra yield, there is less extra labor income to enable poor
people to buy the extra food.
The leveling-off in growth of yields, and thus in growth of farm
employment, is a main cause of the slowdown in poverty reduction. So
it is natural to ask whether, by GM or otherwise, agricultural research
can revive the employment-intensive growth in food staples yields in
developing countries.
                                       
2 CGIAR spending is only 4 per cent of all agricultural research
outlay in and for developing countries, but it counts for much more—
partly because the NARSs depend heavily on CG-generated
germplasm for their own adaptive breeding, partly because CG
expenditure is increasingly coordinated with (or done alongside)
NARSs, and partly because a large and growing part of NARS’s
work, especially in Africa, is severely harmed by low and fluctuating
funding, of which an increasingly excessive share must be devoted to
salaries and wages with minimal material research support..
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Point 3:  Fertility transition opens a ‘window of
opportunity’ to complete the task of eliminating
food poverty
(a) Must researchers hoe the poverty/staples-yield row forever?
There are, however, two ultimate limits to attainable yield growth in
food staples. On the supply side, the sources of yield growth in the last
50 years—heterosis, then dwarfing, now gene transfer—ultimately face
land, water, and sunlight ceilings. ‘Ultimately’ is a long time, but each
approach to a static asymptote carries rising cost. On the demand side,
only up to a point will low-income groups opt for poverty reduction via
new workplaces in growing tropical food staples, even if higher yields
make it more attractive to employ or self-employ these workers. As SE
China and Malaysia shifted from agricultural growth to industrial
growth, they ended first food poverty, then much moderate poverty.
This can turn low-income countries with many food-poor, into
middle-income countries with few food-poor, but carries us only that
far. In Britain or the US, even in Uruguay or Thailand, even the worst-
off 20% are not so poor that they cannot eat properly, nor so needy
that they demand work in agriculture even if they get no more than,
say, 1.5 times their family’s basic needs. Also in these countries when
income rises, even among the poor, they do not consume much more
food staples.
Since neither supply of research to sustainably raise staples yields, nor
demand of even low-income groups for farm work and calories, is
limitless, agricultural researchers—having twice responded to the
challenges of world poverty reduction, first with maize hybrids, then
with rice and wheat semi-dwarfs—can reasonably ask for some
assurance that this third request, to pull the remaining 800 million out
of hunger, will be the last. If GM research is turned round—properly
restructured to meet their basic nutrient needs through a ‘third round’
of higher, more stable and more widely spread staples yields—will that
be the end, so that researchers can escape diminishing returns by
moving to different and in the long run more manageable tasks? Or
are the food-poor always with us, always increasing, always seeking
more farm jobs and staple foods, and ever less researchable, or less
sustainable, rises in staples yields from scientists?
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Some reassurance is provided by the huge reductions in Latin
American poverty around 1965-81, and in Asian poverty around 1970-
89. But dramatic progress in yields remains largely limited to wheat,
rice and maize, and to reasonably reliably watered areas—despite
serious research for other agro-ecologies and food staples (more in the
CGIAR than in many national systems). Africa—where the poor’s
main crops are millet, sorghum, cassava, yams, and white maize,
usually in ill-watered areas—remains little affected outside a few
growth islands.
(b) The ‘demographic window’ for GM-based yield growth to
end food poverty.  There is a more important sign that ‘one more
heave’ from agricultural research, if it can raise yields over a wide area,
can virtually end food poverty—by providing income from labor-
intensive farm work to just two more generations of the poor (Table
5). China’s fertility transition is almost complete. South Asia’s is well
advanced—India’s total fertility rate (TFR) fell from over 6 in 1951 to
just above 3 today. Also, Africa’s long-delayed fertility transition is
under way. Of the African countries with acceptable data, nine have
seen moderate to large falls in TFRs of 1.5-2 or more in the last 20
years (Kenya, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Botswana, S. Africa, Côte d’Ivoire
and Senegal), with smaller falls (0.5-1.5) in thirteen more.3
Why is this a ‘window of opportunity’, suggesting that a third, perhaps
GM-based, upsurge in labor-intensive staples yield growth can
permanently end the severest forms of food poverty? National cross
sections, based on household survey data, suggest that in the ‘average
developing country’ a reduction in birth rates of 4 per 1000—typical of
what developing countries achieved in the 1980s—lowers poverty ten
                                       
3 Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Benin, SW
and NE Nigeria [Cohen 1998: 1431-5, 1454-61], N. Sudan [Cleland et al.
1994], and for women aged 15-34 in Namibia, Niger, Madagascar and
Uganda [Kirk and Pillet 1998: 5]. Only Mali shows no fall; this is also
claimed by Cohen [p. 1435] for Madagascar and Uganda,, but the
Demographic and Health Surveys—the reliable source of  most of these
data—show falls in TFRs per woman aged 15-34 of, respectively, 0.9 in
1978-92 and 0.6 in 1971-88 [Kirk and Pillett 1998: 5].
13
years hence from 19 per cent to 14 per cent (the falls being about
equally divided between the effect of higher growth and of more equal
distribution) [Eastwood and Lipton 1999b]. This raises the real
prospect that by 2050-2060 the growth in need for dietary energy—
and, among the poor and hungry, for more farm work, made attractive
by ever higher yields, to earn it with—will stop.
Not only does this pending demographic shift mean that the third,
GM-based, thrust to higher sustainable food yields may be the last we
need. As excitingly, the shift means an improving ratio of adult
workers and savers to dependent children. In 1960-95, East Asia’s
rising ratio of adult workers and savers to dependants added about
1.3% to its yearly rate of growth; this will happen in South Asia in
1995-2025 [Bloom and Williamson 1997] and in Africa in 2000-2035.
The balance among age groups will be revolutionized in 1995-2025. In
Bangladesh, under-fifteens will decline from 40 per cent to 25 per cent
of persons; numbers of working age (15-64) will rise by 82 per cent,
while under-fifteens decline by 4 per cent. In Kenya in 2000-2020, the
UN’s ‘medium variant’ projects population growth in 2000-2020 at 2.2
per cent per year, from 30.3 million to 47.0 million. But children under
15 will increase at only 0.9 per cent per year, as against over 3 per cent
for prime-age adults (15-64). Thus the ratio of prime-age adults—the
main workers and savers—to children will rise from only 1.24 in 2000
to 1.87 in 2020.4
But the demographic window opens on sunlit uplands only if, as
happened in East Asia in the 1970s, rapid staples yield growth permits
more attractive workplaces for the extra workers, savings prospects for
the savers, and affordable food for all—i.e. if farm research (and
reasonable policies) attract the workers to work, and the savers to save.
The gains but will be realized only to the extent that public policy
permits and creates options for people rewardingly to convert potential
into extra production per person. In particular, the anti-poverty
                                       
4 See [UN 1998b: 501]. Kenya has still a high total fertility rate, but
exhibits one of the faster declines in Africa. One reason for choosing
Kenyan projections is that the 1996 data are corrected to allow for the
impact of AIDS. Unfortunately country-specific age-structure projections
from the later (1998) UN revision are not yet available.
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benefits of demographic transition will be realized only to the extent
that public policy stimulates the labor-intensive use of resources in
ways that create income-based entitlements to reliable, affordable and
locally available food staples.
Point 4:  The ‘window’ is useful only if yield
potential revives for tropical food staples
(a) Despite words of false comfort, tropical food staples output
growth must revive.  There is an odd similarity between three
messages wrongly taken to imply that we need not or should not worry
about reviving output growth in tropical food staples, because there is
and will be ‘plenty of food to feed the world’.
§ The first is the message of demographic analysts [e. g. Dyson,
National Academy of Sciences 1999]: world population growth
has peaked; Asian and even African fertility transitions (with their
rising adult/child ratios) are well under way. So (even if ‘food
security for all’ ever was constrained by the size of the ‘pile’ of
global or even national food staples vis-à-vis the population,
which is doubtful), that will not be a problem in future.
‘Malthusian optimism’ is misconceived because the problem is
entitlements [Sen 1981].
§ The second is the message that staples markets work, and will, on
present trends, equate staples supply and demand at affordable
prices even for the poor (except perhaps in Africa) for the
foreseeable future [Mitchell, Ingco and Duncan 1997].
§ The third is the message—often stated by those who deny that
GM plants are a tool for poverty reduction—that there is plenty of
food to ‘feed the world’ and all we need to do is improve its
distribution. It is often added that increasing food supply by
intensive, especially large-farm, agriculture—as is allegedly implied
by GM development—will make the rich richer, will not help the
poor and may make them poorer, and will endanger the
environment.
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These messages contain elements of truth, but are one-sided, and do
not reduce the need for employment-oriented, yield-raising research
into tropical food staples:
· The demographic message: Malthus understood, and wrote, that
population and workforce growth harmed the poor mainly by
depressing their wages and keeping staples prices high.
Correspondingly, demographic transition will provide enough
food for the poor only if they acquire enough extra work to earn
‘entitlements’ and local, affordable staples [Lipton 1991]. If staples
output does not grow, the extra workers per dependant will be
underemployed, underentitled and therefore underfed. Also, poor
people and workers enjoy mortality declines (and female
education) last, and therefore reduce fertility last. They therefore
remain especially vulnerable, for longer, to failures in employment-
based entitlements to food staples.
· The market message asserts only that staples will be supplied to
meet demand, not to meet need. Projections for IFPRI's ‘2020
Vision’ [Rosegrant et al. 1995] show desperately slow reductions in
global undernutrition in the wake of market-only development,
unless there is a revival in investment and public research. Staples
markets also have little relevance to many poor people in non-
liberalized economies, or in areas (including much of Africa)
where transport costs impede long-distance food trade.
· The distributive message: the more redistribution, and the more
growth, the poor can get, the better. Labor-intensive rural growth
can sometimes be redistributive too. But pro-poor redistribution is
always limited by political possibility. There have been few cases
lately in which the poor have gained durably from major
redistribution of formal access to food, except in circumstances
such as those of China in 1977-85, when radical land
redistribution to family farms was feasible alongside rapid, small-farm-
favorable, employment-intensive technical progress and reduced repression
of farmers’ prices.
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All three messages—demographic, market, distributive— are too
optimistic about poverty trends without revived cereals output growth,
because the messages take too little account of three things. The first is
the gradually falling availability of water to agriculture—as irrigation
systems decline, as new ones become more costly and yield less, and as
water is diverted to urban and industrial uses. The second is the
growing diversion of cereals from food to feed, as rich people’s
incomes grow. The third is that, over time, each unit of farm growth is
producing fewer workplaces—even though much more than other
sources of growth.
This is not to deny that demographics, markets and redistribution can
help the poor. It is to assert that their range is often incomplete, slow
and imperfect. It remains vital to reverse the slowdown in staples yield
growth, and the locking into private monopolies of the secrets of its
renewal.
(b) Tropical staples output growth will not revive unless yield
growth does.  There are fewer and fewer areas, even in West Africa
or South America, where ‘spare land but scarce year-round labor’ is a
convincing diagnosis. So more staples output and employment
increasingly means higher yields. Moreover agricultural research,
planned now, may take 5-15 years to produce results (though GM, if
applied, speeds this up). In ten years, workers per unit of farmland in
most developing countries will have risen by over 20 per cent.
Whether those workers occupy farmland, or move to towns (which
expand into farmland) and demand staples from others who occupy it,
its scarcity will rise. Research designed today must concentrate on
raising yields, in most of the developing world to allow for today’s land
constraints, elsewhere to allow for tomorrow’s. That means higher
yields.
I was one of many who in the 1970s, observing the adoption lags
among smaller and poorer farmers and in rain-parched areas—and the
often input-demanding, management-intensive and risky nature of the
earlier HYVs—advocated a shift from yield improvement as a research
goal to yield stability and spread. The CG institutions had seen that
point well before I did. By 1972 improved resistance to moisture stress
was defined in its Annual Report as IRRI’s main task. The farmers
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were there even before the researchers; rice varieties like IR-20 and
rust-resistant wheat semidwarfs spread to rain-fed lands beyond their
initial target area [Lipton and Longhurst 1989]. Also researchers,
seeing varieties attacked by a range of new pest biotypes, turned
towards defensive, yield-maintaining breeding. As regards wheat yield
for the period 1950-86, the green revolution was the culmination of
an era in which wheat breeders achieved rapid increases in yield
potential accompanied by higher yield variances—but later post-green
revolution era saw  slower mean yield growth but relatively rapid
improvement in yield stability [Traxler 1995]. This confirms recent
work by Maredia and Byerlee [1999], showing that the rising yield
instability for Indian wheat in the early green revolution—identified by
Hazell from 1982 [e.g. Hazell 1987]—had been reversed. There is also
evidence that in the later years, for rice as well as wheat, yield gains
came increasingly from shifts to new areas, and less and less from
growing yields in given areas.
Without resiling from the case for shifting to stability and spread in
1970, I think the numbers now show the clear need for a shift back to emphasis
on yield enhancement. This will mean enhancing yield potential. It is a myth
that yield can be substantially enhanced without higher yield potentials
from new science—that stupid farmers or stupid extension systems are
failing to use safe and economic innovations ‘on the shelf’. They are
on the shelf for good reason. The old mantra—earlier ploughing,
Scotch carts, massive manure additions and all that—have been
uselessly preached at African farmers for decades, as contour bunding
once was in India. The gap between yields in farmers’ fields and the
economic maximum yield in most of Asia is now small. In Africa the gap
is often larger, but real risks, inappropriate fertilizers, and access,
transport and marketing problems prevent sensible farmers from
raising yields. The reason farmers reject manuring, early or no tillage,
etc. is that they do not pay with low-yielding germplasm. Governments
can persuade farmers to approach closer to static yield potentials by
correcting price biases against agriculture (but most of that has been
done) and by building more rural infrastructure (but that is increasingly
costly, the most cost-effective being usually put in first).
In brief, yield potential—and economic optimum yield well below it—
are asymptotes. If yield potential rises only slowly, so, sooner or later,
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will farmers’ yields. And yield potential has risen disturbingly slowly
for main staples since the mid-1980s at least. Alarmingly, this is most
strongly the case in lead areas.
This is in part because—while public sector NARSs declined in real
terms in Africa and Latin America in the 1980s and one awaits the
1990s figures with trepidation—the CG system has experienced
‘mission creep’ without the resources to finance its new missions.
CGIAR investment in increasing productivity fell steadily from 74 per
cent of outlay in 1972-76 to 46 per cent in 1992-96 and 39 per cent in
the latest year, 1997-98 [CGIAR Secretariat, pers. comm., 1999]. The
CGIAR’s crown jewels—germplasm enhancement and breeding—fell
from an already severely attenuated 24 per cent of their outlay in 1992
to 18 per cent of much the same real outlay in 1996 [Anderson and
Dalrymple 1999: 12].
This is not to deny that the new tasks imposed on the CGIAR system
are laudable. Spending on ‘protecting the environment’ and ‘saving
biodiversity’ rose from 6.5 per cent of CGIAR outlays in 1972-76 to
17 per cent in 1997-98 [CGIAR Secretariat, pers. comm., 1999]. But
with CG funding static in real terms, and increasingly tied up in special
projects, such trends are bound to mean absolute falls in the system’s
capacity to revive yields, and indeed to maintain security against biotic
and abiotic stresses. ‘Mission creep’ without funding creep protects neither the
environment nor the poor. Rather, it contributes to the bleeding of lead science out of
the public sector, and the accompanying and worrying sluggishness of yield
potentials, and hence of yields, in tropical food staples. Unless this is redressed,
more marginal lands will be overcropped, and more poor people underemployed.
Point 5:  GM plant research is a key tool for
breeding to improve staples yield potential, stability,
spread, sustainability and employment—but is not
being used well
If the yield potentials of tropical staples—and their field yields—are
now growing at more normal rates, historically speaking, than in 1965-
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85, it is very unlikely that this is because scientists, any more than
extension workers or farmers, are making silly mistakes. But what is to
be done?
Crops derived from gene transfers went commercial in the USA only
in 1994, and in 1999 were found in over half US processed food sales,
and globally on over 70 million hectares, including most US maize and
soybean plantings. There appears to have been no health or
environmental damage directly linked to GM crops, and the scientists
with whom I served on the Nuffield Committee [Nuffield Council
1999] appeared to concur that there was in principle no difference
between possible environmental and health problems from GM
varieties and those from others.
While over 90 per cent of GM crops are grown in the developed
world, this is changing. China has substantial areas under GM maize,
rice, cotton, and until recently tobacco. Argentina has several million
hectares under GM crops legally, and Southern Brazil illegally. Farmers
and consumers are still voting with their purses for GM crops (though
this may change). Also, the technology has shown the power to insert
genes for many purposes, from increasing beta-carotene5 and iron
absorbable by humans, to killing targeted insects, to rendering a crop
immune to specific herbicides. Characteristics depending on many
genes, such as resistance to moisture stress or yield potential, are much
more complex to modify through gene transfer. However, this can
insert, into a plant type grown in a particular ecosystem, genes from
outside that plant type—as Borlaug did when he crossed rye (for cold-
tolerance) with wheat (for yield potential) and produced triticale, and
as all wide crosses do, but with more ‘width’ and (to the extent that
gene functions become known) more accuracy. Perhaps latency at the
time of anther formation might be transferred into maize; perhaps
much higher yields might be transferred into robust coarse grains
hitherto adapted to survive at low yields in adverse environments. No
                                       
5 X.Ye, S. al-Babili, A. Kloeti, Jing Zhang, P/Lucca, P. Beyer and I.
Potrykus, 'Engineering the Provitamin A (beta-carotene) biosynthetic
pathway into (carotenoid-free) rice endosperm,' Science, 287: 303-
305, 14 Jan. 2000.
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wonder Conway [1997] argued that GM crops might well raise yield
potential, and field yields, in just those difficult, low-progress areas
least touched by the green revolution.
Nobody, certainly no economist or other unnatural scientist, knows
what GM plants can do to cut world poverty by providing tropical
food staples with faster-rising yield potential, more robustness, more
amenability to small farms and labor-intensive use. But if the duck we
are shooting is the third great breakthrough of the century in tropical
staples—after maize hybrids and wheat and rice semidwarfs—then
GM plants quack plausibly, and are the only duck on the block.
But GM research, which may well have enormous potential to reduce
malnutrition and poverty, is being largely directed by people for whom
the employment-intensive enhancement of yield and robustness in
main food staples, especially if grown by poor farmers who can retain
seeds, can never be a main motive. GM research is therefore being
steered to crops, traits, and types of farm that are not very relevant,
and that may sometimes be harmful, to the poor. A related set of
problems was tackled in the 1960s and 1970s as international and
NARS breeding priorities changed to accommodate the critics of early
‘museums of insect pests’ like TN1 and even IR8 rice, best suited to
the needs of big farmers. But at least these were already food staples.
It will need a different approach, and institutional innovation, to tackle
today’s problem due to the privatization of so much agricultural
research—and knowledge.
To explore this approach, we need to ask what it is about the products
of GM crop development that fails to benefit the poor in developing
countries. The answers, and the exceptions, will point to the reasons,
and the possible solutions. In general three things about within-GM
priorities are inappropriate for poverty reduction: crops, traits, and
target users.
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Crops: Three crops still dominate GM plants in the field—maize, soy
beans, and cotton.6 Unfortunately the yellow-maize varieties and the
soy beans, grown with GM, are almost all fed to animals rather than
being used as staples for poor people. In general, commercial GM seed
suppliers will show little interest in self-pollinating crops unless they
can protect their IPRs.
Exceptions: Rice may become a massive exception to the rule that GM
research does little to cheapen or improve the staples grown and eaten
by the poor. That is due to Chinese researchers, the Rockefeller
Foundation, the Swiss research on beta-carotene-enriched rice, and the
recent transfer by John Innes Institute of the wheat-dwarfing gene into
rice. It remains to be seen, however, whether these public efforts—still
small beside the GM budgets of the Big Five for animal feeds—suffice
to achieve major breakthroughs applicable over large areas, or to rice
with currently low or unreliable yields.
Traits: The trait most widely spread by private-sector plant GM
research is herbicide resistance. Relatively to higher yield or greater
robustness under moisture stress, this is a very low priority for the
poor.  Absolutely, it displaces labor—especially if used to permit no-
till farming [Naylor 1994]—and (except in some impoverished uplands
where herbicide is unlikely to be used) adds little to yields. Insect
resistance via a gene to express Bt toxin is the second main trait
inserted; this or analogous traits would, if inserted into appropriate
crops, raise small-farm yield and create productive (harvest)
employment, but single-gene resistance, especially if it destroys the
attacker, notoriously induces new pest biotypes and poor farmers are
not best placed for swift response. Shelf life and other high-end quality
features (as in FlavrSaver tomatoes) also typify the GM traits produced
responsively to the demands of the well-off.
                                       
6 Tobacco is another significant GM crop (only partly for
experimental reasons relating to transferability of traits). I am
sometimes asked whether GM crops pose health hazards. I refer such
questions to real scientists, but add that one such crop must qualify. If
you become addicted to cigarettes based on GM tobacco, you have a
1 in 6 chance of dying as a result. That is also true for non-GM
tobacco.
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Exceptions. What poor farmers do want is genetic modification to raise
yields, or to permit good plant types to grow in formerly recalcitrant
environments. The few striking examples of GM carrying these traits
come mostly from the public sector—Fan Shen yield-enhancing rice
hybrids in China, with Rockefeller support; insertion of citric acid
secreting genes against aluminum toxicity into Mexican wheat; and of
virus-resistant genes into Colombian potatoes and Kenyan sweet
potatoes. Rockefeller/Swiss beta-carotene (and perhaps iron) enriched
‘golden rice’ has characteristics of huge value to millions of children at
risk each year of blindness from Vitamin A deficiency (and to pregnant
women endangered by anemia) but it will be important to turn these
consumer gains into active consumer demand, if farmers are to face
incentives to adopt such GM varieties.
Targets: Commercial researchers and suppliers of GM crops aim,
rightly, to meet market demand, and to select farmers who are readily
able and willing to transport and pay for inputs, preferably with scale
economies and avoiding dealer costs. This strongly targets large, and
therefore seldom labor-intensive, farmers and bypasses most small
farmers (and most of their landless employees). These access
advantages of the large farmer in obtaining (normally private-sector)
GM seeds are much likelier to be long-lasting than were the
advantages she enjoyed in the first green revolution (initial capacity to
take more risks and obtain credit for seeds).
Exceptions: Even in developing countries (Argentina, Brazil), adopters
of GM crops have been mainly large farmers, often seeking herbicide-
resistant crops and (presumably) displacing weeders, human and/or
rotary, with Glyphosate. China is probably an exception, dominated
still by fairly equal family farms, though the distribution of GM crops
by farm size is unknown. And if Rockefeller’s ‘golden rice’ is fed into
the system via the CGIAR and NARSs there is no reason why it
should not be as welcome on small farms as on big.
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Point 6:  Proper application of GM on plant
research to help the world’s poor requires radical
institutional innovation in agricultural research
Several things are also inappropriate to poverty reduction about the
public environment for GM development. Above all the corporatization of
property rights in plant materials may threaten both farmers’ lines and
international and national public agricultural research, and increasingly
lock elite lines into private quasi-monopolies, eroding the competitive
viability of public and farmers’ plants alike. Yet some such
corporatization may be needed, to create incentives for the 90% or
more of GM plant science now in the private corporate sector.
The problem is that GM development appears to be the most
promising route to staples yield enhancement for poverty reduction—
yet is locked into a system where it is not used for such purposes, and
where a few large firms are competitively bound to protect their
investments by means that, at present, threaten public research.
Attempting to outlaw or demonize either GM science (an absurd
though popular undertaking) or the huge number of top-class
scientists seeking to practice it privately, will get nowhere. So how is
the demise of competitive and public action for world poverty
reduction to be avoided?
Current privatizing and lock-in trends range from patenting, via F1
hybrids that rapidly lose vigor if kept by farmers for re-use, to Genetic
Use Restriction Technology (GURTs), ‘traitor’ technologies or
chemical activators.7 Where there is competitive public and private
supply, these methods need not threaten small farmers (or poor
consumers). These, long before GM, did very well out of privately but
competitively developed and distributed maize hybrids in the USA.
Also, there is no persuasive evidence that the lock-in technologies
                                       
7 The voluntary abandonment by Monsanto of plans to develop one of
the four currently patented ideas for a variety-specific GURT (v-
GURT)—which can be rescinded at any time—is a welcome response
to critics, but does not make much difference to the development and
use of a range of technical lock-ins as and when profitable.
24
threaten farmers or environments directly.8 But the increasing
monopolization, and the impending protection by a wide range of
technologies, of specific elite traits (hardware) does appear to threaten,
albeit gradually, ‘the demise of public sector research’ [Swanson and
Göschl 1999]—and of competition from other private seed
suppliers—as a succession of leading-edge varieties, embodying
progressively further advances from other varieties with elite traits, is
developed, based on locked-in hardware, by the Big Five or their even
fewer successors.
Are the losses due to reduction in competitive public and private
research, in the wake of protection of GM plants via IPRs, outweighed
by the larger volume of research induced by such protection? The
incentive from IPRs, legal or technical, demonstrably raises the
amount of private research, as the expansion of private wheat research
around the 1970 UPOV legislation showed  [Pray and Knudsen 1994;
Swanson and Göschl 1999]. But ‘technical IPRs’ such as GURTs create
property rights that accrue to, and encourage research by, only final
developers. Incentives do not reach originators—whether the farmer-
researchers who selected seed over generations, or the NARSs and CG
institutions that developed it and passed seed (usually free) to private
researchers. It is far from clear that providing the latter (via GURTs or
otherwise) with total ‘appropriability’, and downstream breeders with
none, is economically optimal—or even tenth best—even on simple
efficiency grounds, i.e. leaving ethics, income distribution and
externalities aside for a moment.
                                       
8 If the v-GURT gene is dominant it could in principle cross-pollinate
with non-GURT plants and reduce their germination rate, but the
number of such occurrences would be relatively small—probably not
noticeable among the many cases (and causes) of non-germination.
Further, obviously, dominant inherited non-germination is self-
eliminating—the reverse of evolutionary selection! Indeed, GURTs
should reassure those who—surely wrongly—regard genetic drift
from bred varieties to other plants, including those of related species
(e.g. from herbicide-resistant rape to wild radish weeds), as somehow
more dangerous from GM varieties than from other varieties.
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Is it really an efficient system of plant breeding incentives, if the final
researchers in such a vertically integrated R and D system appropriate
(say) 70 per cent of selection-effort value free, add 1-30 per cent of
value, and then obtain the rights, by law or technology, to collect
economic rents on 100 per cent by value? In this context it is relevant
to recall that the CGIAR (presumably CIMMYT) originated
germplasm in over 40 per cent of North American and Australian
wheat in early 1990s [Byerlee, pers. comm].
The selective development and use of increasingly enforceable and
‘technified’ IPRs, often defined widely and encompassing others’
intellectual property as well as one’s own, has an even more serious
effect than these possible efficiency distortions. As elite lines are
locked in, public research is gradually squeezed out, despite its high
returns [Pinstrup-Andersen 1985; Alston et al. 1998], and despite its
unique incentives to work on items that serve many countries, poor and dispersed
farmers, and remote areas.
Swanson and Göschl [1999] argue that—because it is in developing
countries that seed companies are least able to enforce patents—
techniques such as GURTs should induce ‘a disproportionately greater
increase in R&D expenditures on varieties suitable for use in
developing countries’, and this would apply to any enforcement, legal
or technical, of IPRs that could be successfully implemented in such
countries. It might indeed work for big, rich, low-employment farmers
in S. Brazil and N. Argentina. But it would not induce them to grow
food staples, to be labor-intensive, or otherwise to benefit the poor;
nor would it address the mass of farmers in developing countries. It is
not just low appropriability of seed benefits that renders such farmers
unattractive targets for a big private input supplier; it is that they are
often costly to service, because often tiny, diverse, risk-averse, hard to
reach, illiterate, or hard to deliver to and recover from. Such features
are inelastic to GURTs or even patents. The composition of seed
research will become much less pro-poor of public and small-scale
private competition is eroded by the monopolization of GM traits with
technically enforced IPRs.
Moreover, though in the developed world private sector research
increasingly swamps public sector, the reverse is still true in the poorer
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countries of Asia, and in Africa. They, especially their poor, would lose
out from the competitive demise of public NARSs there, denied—like
the CG system—the cost-cutting GM varieties that had been
developed and corporatized out of its free germplasm. And in Asia or
Africa the extra volume of private research might not equal the lost
volume of gains from public research, quite apart from the lost
distributional benefits of the latter.
These trends have worrying implications for the poor. GM staples
present a major prospect of helping them through revived food staples
yields. But who will be concerned with future research to enhance the
nutritional quality of food staples, or the resistance of African maize
cultivars to moisture stress? Even if the scenario of ‘demise’ of public
agricultural research is far-fetched or very long-term, will not the
growing rewards of plant breeding in the patent- or technology-
protected, monopolizing firms—alongside the fall in such work in the
CG system and many NARSs—increasingly deplete the public sector
of leading-edge, GM-related scientific skills? Is that not bound to
accentuate what needs correcting: the systematically wrong traits,
crops, and farms emphasized by purely profit-seeking research; the
huge incentives to turn public goods into private ones; the grotesque
concentration of GM research, as of medical research, on the often
peripheral preferences of the wealthy, to the neglect of public goods as
well as of the basic needs of the poor?
What remedies exist? NARSs or international public agencies could
themselves secure patents (as the CG is considering), or otherwise
technically lock in their releases (a course that the CG has rightly
rejected). Either course would level the competitive playing field
between public and private sectors, but would defeat some of the
objectives of having public research at all.
Assuming the CG follow its traditions, and seeks public-access
development of the GM plant science to serve the needs of the poor
in the developing world, there appear to be two strategic options.
One is to work with the half dozen developing country NARSs with
substantial GM research capacity to design and finance a major
expansion around agreed crops, regions, traits, and types of farm
27
target. This is attractive, but big money may be needed, there are
problems with excluded countries, and private lock-ins make success
doubtful.
The other is to build on big GM firms’ need for better public image
and their growing recognition that current arrangements for GM
research are not working globally [Raven, pers. comm.]. The public
sector—with the CG system in the lead—could explore a number of
routes to collaboration with the private sector to secure the objectives
of poverty reduction, public goods provision, and the capture of
spillover effects. One route is for NARSs jointly, or the CG, or both,
to define specific breeding tasks likely to require GM inputs, and to
put the completion of these tasks, or the achievement of field-proven
varieties with certain characteristics, out to competitive tender.
Another is to offer substantial prizes—tens of millions of dollars at
least—for developing such varieties. Companies could in either case of
course use their patented or protected germplasm as an input, but the
final product (the seeds) would have to be free of technical restrictions
on retention for re-use (other than, with F1 hybrids, loss of hybrid
vigor). A third approach is to build on the practice of at least one of
the ‘GM giants’ of attracting scientists by allowing them to use a part
of their time (about 15 per cent) for self-prioritized research using
company real capital; perhaps a CG or NARS institution could buy
into that approach. Fourth, joint public-private funding is feasible for
certain tasks.
Finally, to cite Conway and Tonniessen [1999]: ‘Big life science
companies [could] license IPRs over certain  key techniques/materials
for use in developing countries at no cost (e.g. privately held genomic
data about rice); and negotiate agreement to share financial rewards
from IPR claims on crop varieties or crop traits of distinct national
origin, e.g. South Asian basmati rice.’
But this, like all the above suggestions, requires that the GM giant
companies believe they have something to gain by agreeing, and that
NARSs believe—and plan—that the poor’s interests are advanced.
There is clearly a danger of ‘strategic behavior’ by companies or
NARSs and that is why the CG has to hold the ring and seek ground
rules. The first need is to take a strategic decision to go with lead
28
NARSs, with lead GM companies, or (very difficult but excellent if
feasible) with both at once. I doubt if more than 5 per cent of the
necessary shift of GM research to the interests of the poor can be
achieved by appealing to companies’ goodwill. Ultimately companies
must satisfy the market. Thus the remaining 95 per cent of the need
can be met only by shifting the incentives and institutions that lead to
market responses.
Point 7:  Realigning the public policy debate about
GMs
All these prospects could go for nothing. The evidence presented to
the Nuffield Council [1999] suggests that in Britain, as in other parts
of Europe and indeed India and Africa, a great anti-scientific wave,
launched by such disasters as BSE, might swamp—or at least severely
delay—GM development, pro-poor or not. Can the concerns of many
of the critics for environment, accountability and poverty be turned to
support of selective, open development of the ‘right’ GM crops, traits,
and targets? Should, and does, the CGIAR system lead?
There are several crucial areas for review. One is the precautionary
principle: it may make sense to take no extra risk for a longer-life
tomato, but it makes no sense to take no extra risk to avoid blindness
due to Vitamin A deficiency;9 it may make sense to apply some fairly
extreme version of the precautionary principle to all products of plant
breeding, but not to apply it exclusively to GM varieties, already the
most regulated, though safer than, for example, mutagens or wide
crosses.
However, it may be an unwise strategy to couch the argument about
GM plants in terms of a confrontation between scientists and critics.
                                       
9 Is precaution served by stopping research into GM-based beta-
carotene-enhanced rice, or even by delaying release during years of
tests, while children go blind? My next monarch dismisses such
arguments as ‘emotional blackmail’. Facts do not go away because
they are called names; facts are facts, however uncomfortable.
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The critics may well be, and in my judgement are, wrong and
unscientific on risks to health, environment and biodiversity; GM
offers opportunities, rather than dangers, in these areas if well used.
But the critics are right in being concerned with the economic effects,
especially on the poor, of the current corporate structures that
determine the use, composition, and distribution of GM plants.
Further, while GM plants probably do not present special problems  of
health or environment,10 there are huge issues around both, presenting
special problems to developing countries. It is much wiser to focus
efforts on such issues, using GM as a catalyst, instead of insisting
pedantically (i.e. scientifically) that GM does not create such issues.
For example, the lentil Lathyrus sativus used to cause many million
cases of lathyrism in India, and is creeping into Ethiopia. How is such
damage to be prevented from creeping into the food chain? Many
developing countries have millions of tiny farmers, food processors
and retailers, and limited capacity for central regulatory management.
Into this situation GM crops enter; suddenly health, environment and
biodiversity standards are proposed that should apply all round
(antibiotic markers are an immeasurably smaller problem than the
feeding of antibiotics to animals, let alone misprescribing). The law-
based regulatory methods of Europe and the US may be less
appropriate than extension, science and consultation, with the law as
last resort.
Not only should GM be a catalyst, through which the CGIAR, FAO
and WHO could jointly attack such problems; GM plants could even
be developed to help address those problems and solve them. The
debate is best served by saying: there are health/environment issues,
especially hard for developing countries, exemplified by the GM
debate but going beyond it;  can public and private skills, using the
enlightened self-interest of all food industries in not poisoning
customers, help? CGIAR/FAO/WHO should engage biotech
companies—often with health as well as agricultural interests—in the
                                       
10 For example, standard IRRI rice varieties that biochemically resist
BPH-III are as likely to poison non-targeted insects as are GM
varieties with Bt gene to poison monarch butterflies.
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debate on how to improve health/environment regulation in
developing countries.
Afterword
Another agricultural pioneer, Thomas Jefferson, warned that national
Constitutions needed adaptation, from time to time, to new situations.
What is true of constitutions is true of institutions. Sir John Crawford
would surely have said today that, 28 years after the birth of the
CGIAR, radical institutional innovation in agricultural research is again
needed, to match the new science and the new economics. As when
Sir John addressed the issue, so again now: poverty reduction and
public agricultural research face a shared ‘crisis’, in the medical sense—
a turning point after which they will either decline or recover. Then as
now, a good outcome will redirect the potential of new science, and
the talents of private as well as public research, towards labor-intensive
production of tropical food staples.
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Table 1. People mainly dependent on agriculture for income as % of total population, 1950-2010.
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000* 2010*
Developing 79.0 73.8 68.8 63.3 57.8 52.3 46.8
E SE Asia 76.2 70.7 63.5 55.8 50.7 44.9 39.7
LatAmer & Car 55.4 50.1 42.8 34.9 26.2 21.1 16.7
South Asia 75.9 71.3 69.0 65.8 60.1 55.2 50.0
Sub-Sahara 87.0 83.7 80.6 73.9 69.3 63.5 57.8
Source: FAOSTAT data tape 1999                      *projections
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Table 2. Absolute poverty 1970-90 for selected Asian countries
Number of absolute poor (millions) Incidence of poverty
1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990
China Total 275 220 100 33 28 9
Rural 267 211 95 39 11
Urban 8 9 5 5 2
%Poor in rural areas 97 96 95
Indonesia Total 70 42 27 60 29 15
Rural 56 33 18 58 28 14
Urban 14 9 9 73 29 17
%Poor in rural areas 82 80 66
Korea Total 7 4 2 23 10 5
Rural 6 1.5 0.4 28 9 4
Urban 1 2.5 1.6 16 10 5
%Poor in rural areas 84 37 20
Malaysia Total 2 1 0.4 18 9 2
Rural 1.7 0.9 0.3 21 4
Urban 0.3 0.1 0.1 10 1
%Poor in rural areas 85 85 85
Phillippines Total 13 14 13 35 30 21
Rural 11 11 10 42 35 27
Urban 2 3 3 20 18 11
%Poor in rural areas 85 75 77
Thailand Total 9.5 7.9 9 26 17 16
Rural 9 7.4 8.5 30 19 20
Urban 0.5 0.5 0.5 9 5 4
%Poor in rural areas 94 94 94
Six Countries Total 377 289 152 35 23 10
Rural 351 265 132 40 27 12
Urban 26 24 20 13 9 5
%Poor in rural areas 93 92 87
Source: Johansen (1993)
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Table 3. Population living below US1$ per day in developing countries, 1987-98.
Headcount index (percent)
Regions
Population
covered by at
least one survey
1987 1990 1993 1996 1998*
East Asia and the Pacific 90.8 26.6 27.6 25.2 14.9 15.3
(excluding China) 22.9 15 12.4 8.1 5.1
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 81.7 0.2 1.6 4 5.1 5.1
Latin America & the Caribbean 88 15.3 16.8 15.3 15.6 15.6
Middle East and North Africa 52.5 11.5 9.3 8.4 7.8 7.3
South Asia 97.9 44.9 44 42.4 40.1 40
Sub-Saharan Africa 72.9 46.6 47.7 49.6 48.5 46.3
Total 88.1 28.7 29.3 28.5 24.3 24.3
(excluding China) 29.6 29.3 28.5 27.3 27.3
Source: 'Poverty trends and voices of the poor', Washington, D.C. World Bank, 1999.               *Estimated
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Table 4. Rate of yield growth (%): Cereals, roots and tubers,
1961-1997.
Cereals
Africa Developing E SE Asia LatAmer
&Car
South
Asia
Sub-Sahara
1961-71 1.03* 2.76 1.96 1.43 1.88 (0.29)
1971-81 1.98 2.76 2.03 2.38 2.33 2.04
1981-91 (0.75) 1.86 1.67 0.74 3.09 (-0.07)
1991-98 (1.13) 1.55 0.86 2.72 1.7 (0.97)
1966-82 1.94 2.7 2.36 2.23 2.3 1.76
1982-98 0.75 1.67 1.35 2.05 2.69 (0.06)
Roots and tubers
Africa Developing E SE Asia LatAmer
&Car
South
Asia
Sub-Sahara
1961-71 0.65 2.95 (0.4) 1.57 4.13 0.65
1971-81 1.52 1.19 2.92 -0.77 1.73 1.44
1981-91 1.95 0.73 1.06 1.07 1.62 1.91
1991-98 (0.34) 0.99 (0.09) 1.02 1.09 (0.25)
1966-82 0.61 1.12 2.38 -0.56 2.04 0.52
1982-98 1.42 0.7 (0.21) 0.87 1.5 1.42
Source: FAOSTAT data tape 1999.  Exponential growth-trend fit beta not
significant.  * Significant at 10 per cent. All othr entries significant at 5 per
cent
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Chart 2
Trends in Roots and Tubers Yield
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Table 5. Demographic transition 1980-1996
Crude Birth Rate Crude Death Rate Population
Growth
1980 1996 1980 1996 1980 1996
East Asia and Pacific 22 19 8 7 1.5 0.9
Europe and Central Asia 19 13 10 11 0.7 0.2
Latin America and Caribbean 31 23 8 7 1.9 1.4
Middle East and North Africa 41 29 11 7 2.9 2.1
South Asia 37 27 14 9 2.1 1.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 47 41 18 14 2.8 2.5
Source: World Bank, African Poverty Status Report 2000, Washington, DC, forthcoming
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